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Cutting the Bill for Commonwealth Edison's Nuclear Power
Plants: Important Gains for Illinois Public Utility Customers
by Robert L. Jones, Jr.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1993, Commonwealth
Edison (Edison) agreed to pay its Illinois customers $1.3 billion, the largest refund issued by any public utility
in United States history. The company also agreed to reduce its electricity rates by $339 million per year.
This refund and rate reduction settled
a decade-long series of cases with consumer advocates over the billions of
dollars Edison spent constructing five
nuclear power plants. They provide
much-needed relief to Edison customers, who historically have paid some
of the highest electricity rates in the
country. But more importantly, the
decade of litigation has dramatically
changed Illinois public utility law.
Because of the litigation and reforms
to the Illinois Public Utilities Act,
Edison and other Illinois utility companies will be far less likely to build
more giant nuclear power plants which up until recently, proved to be a
financial boon to utility company investors but a bust for utility customers. Instead, utility companies will
have a strong incentive to meet future
growth in electricity demand through
energy-efficiency programs, smallerscale power production, and other alternatives. These options are less
costly to consumers and less harmful
to the environment.
Edison has 12 nuclear power plants
in operation - more than any other
investor-owned utility in the country
- and they account for the majority of
electricity generated by the utility company. The recent litigation involved
five of the last six plants Edison built.
Edison sought permission to build
these plants in the early 1970's and
started operating them during the
1980's. The nuclear power plants in-

volved in the litigation were: LaSalle
1, which began operation in 1982;
Byron 1 and 2, which began operation
in 1985 and 1987, respectively; and
Braidwood 1 and 2, which began operation in 1987 and 1988, respectively.
The total price tag for those plants
was nearly $11 billion.'
The construction of these nuclear
power plants caused dozens of administrative and court cases. Consumer
advocates questioned the need for the
plants, the safety of their construction, the reasonableness of construction costs, the operating performance
of the plants, and the amount utility
customers were being asked to pay for
their construction. The cases, which
began in 1984, produced a series of
historic decisions, including: the first
and only denial of a nuclear power
plant operating license by the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission;'
four consecutive full or partial reversals by the Illinois Supreme Court of
Illinois Commerce Commission
(Commission) utility rate increases;3
a Commission determination that
Edison may not earn a return on most
of its $5 billion investment in two
operational nuclear power plants be4
cause they are currently unneeded;
and orders requiring Edison to pay
separate refunds to its customers of
approximately $70 million,5 $250 million,6 and $420 million,7 prior to the
current refund. In all, Edison will
have paid over $2 billion in refunds
and foregone hundreds of millions of
dollars more on account of rate increases that were prevented from taking effect.
Before this litigation, utility companies had an enormous advantage
over parties who tried to intervene in
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rate cases on behalf of customers. But
the resolution of these cases against
Edison has begun to level the playing
field between Illinois utility customers and utility companies in a number
of ways:
* The standing of consumer intervenors has been elevated in court proceedings as well as in proceedings
before the Commission, which approves electricity rate increases, approves power plant construction, and
establishes public utility policy;
* Illinois utilities are now required
to bear more of the financial burden of
unreasonable construction costs and
poor operating performance of power
plants;
0 The ability of utilities to recover
the costs of constructing excess generating capacity has been limited;
* The power of reviewing courts to
fashion equitable procedures and remedies when rate increases are challenged has been affirmed;
* The Commission is now required
to decide electricity rate increases on
the merits, and cannot strike deals
with utilities; and
- Members of the Commission must
adhere to more rigorous standards of
impartiality.
A full account of the Edison litigation would require hundreds of pages.
Instead, this article will provide a brief
history of the most significant cases,
their key holdings, and their possible
future implications.
II. BYRON 1: ESTABLISHING
UTILITIES' RESPONSIBILITY TO
PAY FOR UNREASONABLE
POWER PLANT
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
The Byron I litigation unleashed a
chain of events that dramatically reshaped Illinois public utilities law.
Although the Byron 1 cases led to a
number of significant reforms, the
most important was the abolition of
the presumption by the Commission
that all of a utility's power plant construction costs are reasonable. The
Byron 1 litigation forced Edison to
absorb $330 million in unreasonable
38

I
plant costs for the construction of that
plant. It also paved the way for another $734 million in construction cost
disallowances for Byron 2, Braidwood
1, and Braidwood 2.
Power plants are the lifeblood of an
electric utility's rates. Utilities are
allowed to charge customers for not

[T]he decade of litigation has
dramatically changed Illinois
public utility law. Because of
the litigation and reforms to
the Illinois Public Utilities Act,
Edison and other Illinois
utility companies will be far
less likely to build more giant
nuclear power plants - which
up until recently, proved to be
a financial boon to utility
company investors but a bust
for utility customers.

only the plant construction costs, amortized over several decades, but also
for a fixed rate of return on the
unamortized balance of its power plant
investment.8 That rate of return, set by
the Commission, has ranged over the
past decade from 13 to 15.4 percent.
(The other major components of rates
are the utility's operating, maintenance, and fuel costs.) Utilities therefore have a strong incentive to build
new plants. Prior to the Byron 1
litigation, that incentive was especially
strong because Illinois utilities enjoyed an almost automatic passthrough of power plant construction
costs to consumers. A utility simply
had to present its bill of costs to the
Commission along with summary testimony regarding the reasonableness
of the costs. The Commission presumed all such costs reasonable and
allowed the utility to recover them,
unless a consumer advocate or the
Commission staff9could affirmatively
prove that specific costs were unreasonable.' 0

The presumption of reasonableness
was a virtual guarantee of full cost
recovery, because neither consumer
organizations nor the Commission
staff possessed the financial or personnel resources to conduct comprehensive reviews of construction
costs. l For example, the $1.3 billion
dollar cost of Edison's LaSalle I
nuclear plant was added to the rate
base in 1982 without any contest or
disallowance with respect to construction costs. 2 However, the litigation
over Edison's Byron 1 plant permanently reversed that presumption of
reasonableness.
A. Denialof the Byron I Operating
License
The first major decision leading to
a change in the reasonableness presumption was issued not by an Illinois
court or agency, but rather by the
federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). On January 13, 1984, the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(Licensing Board) of the NRC issued
an order denying an operating license
for Edison's Byron 1 plant "because
of inadequacies in [Edison's] quality
assurance program." 3 The Licensing
Board found that Edison had failed to
insure that its contractors carried out
their delegated quality assurance tasks.
Some contractors' quality assurance
programs were found inadequate,
while at least one contractor's pro14
gram was deemed "fraudulent."'
Because Edison could not verify the
quality of the construction work, the
Licensing Board was not satisfied "that
the Byron facility can be operated
without undue risk to public health
and safety."' 5
That license denial remains the first
and only unconditional denial ever by
the Licensing Board in the history of
nuclear power plant construction in
the United States. The Licensing
Board's decision sent shock waves
across the nation, prompting banner
headlines in the Chicago Tribune and
a front-page story in the New York
Times.'6
After the license denial, Edison
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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undertook a massive reinspection of
the safety-related construction at
Byron. In October 1984, after Edison
completed the reinspection program
and it was reviewed by the NRC's
Appeals Board, the Licensing Board
approved Byron l's operating li7
cense.'
B. Cost Recovery Litigation before
the Commission and the Illinois
Courts
The license denial prompted the
Illinois General Assembly to add a
new provision to the Illinois Public
Utilities Act (Act) requiring the Commission to conduct an independent
audit of the reasonableness of each
new power plant's construction
costs. 8 The new provision, Section
30.1 of the Act, 9 prohibited the Commission from allowing a utility to
charge customers for plant construction costs that were not affirmatively
demonstrated as reasonable by an independent audit.2 °
To fulfill the new statutory requirement, the Commission retained an
accounting firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Byron 1 construction costs.2 After reviewing the audit
results, the Commission granted
Edison a $495 million per year rate
increase to recover the $2.55 billion
cost of constructing Byron 1.22 The
Commission disallowed $101.5 million in construction costs as unreasonable, which it estimated to be half
of the cost of the delay in obtaining
23
the operating license.
The Commission's $101.5 million
disallowance was significant. Nonetheless, consumer and governmental
parties to the rate case believed that
the audit had not complied with generally accepted auditing standards and
that the Commission still had unlawfully applied the traditional presumption of reasonableness in Edison's favor. This application of the old presumption allowed Edison to recover
certain costs that it had not demonstrated as reasonable, including half
the delay costs. As a result, the consumer and governmental parties apVolume 6 Number 2/Winter 1994

pealed the rate hike to the Circuit
Court of Cook County. In a scathing
99-page opinion, Judge Richard Curry
reversed the rate hike and criticized
the Commission's misapplication of
Section 30.1.24

Judge Curry stated

that Section 30.1 "represent[s] a radical departure" from the standards that
had previously governed Commission
ratemaking decisions. He also held
that the Commission had demonstrated
"undisguised hostility to the letter and
the spirit of the Section 30.1 audit
requirements" by failing to adequately
scrutinize Byron 1 costs.2 Although
Judge Curry found the rate increase
order to be illegal, he allowed Edison
to collect the higher rates, subject to
refund, pending Edison's appeal of
his order.26
On direct appeal from the circuit
court in People ex rel. Hartigan v.
Illinois Commerce Commission
(Hartigan I), the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed Judge Curry's reversal of the rate order. 27 The supreme
court held that the audit required by
Section 30.1 has reversed the traditional presumption of reasonableness. 2 The court stressed that the
consequence of reversing that presumption was to shift the burden of
proof from consumer intervenors to
the utility. 29 The new presumption
also compelled the Commission to
play an active oversight role when it
evaluated whether the costs were rea-

That license denial remains
the first and only
unconditional denial ever by
the Licensing Board in the
history of nuclear power plant
construction in the United
States. The Licensing
Board's decision sent shock
waves across the nation,
prompting banner headlines
in the Chicago Tribune and a
front-page story in the New
York Times.

I

sonable through an independent audit. The court then remanded the case
to the Commission for a determina-

The Illinois Supreme Court's
BPI I decision was a strong
affirmation of the standing of
consumer intervenors in rate
proceedings, as well as a
strong admonition to the
Commission to decide its
cases by rational, consistent,
and lawful means in
conformity with the Public
Utilities Act.

tion of whether Edison had shown that
the costs were reasonable.30
On remand, the Commission ordered a new construction cost audit by
a different accounting firm.3 As a
result of this new audit, the Commission adopted a further Byron 1 cost
disallowance of $229 million in 1989.
This brought the total Byron 1 cost
disallowance to $330 million. Edison,
consumer, and governmental parties
appealed the new disallowance to the
Illinois Supreme Court. The court
upheld the Commission's unreasonable cost findings in People ex rel.
Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission,a decision known as Hartigan
Hn.32
Following Hartigan H's affirmation of the higher cost disallowance,
Edison paid its customers a refund of
approximately $250 million in the second half of 1992. This refund accounted for the excessive Byron 1
plant costs Edison had collected from
the date of Judge Curry's reversal of
the Byron 1 rate hike through the end
of 1988.11 In addition, Edison ultimately lowered its prospective rates
by $43 million per year to account for
the additional construction cost disallowance.
The impact of Section 30.1, which
requires that utilities affirmatively
39
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prove the reasonableness of their construction costs, and the Byron 1 litigation (HartiganI and II), which imple-

The court stressed that the
consequence of reversing
that presumption was to shift
the burden of proof from
consumer intervenors to the
utility. The new presumption
also compelled the
Commission to play an active
oversight role when it
evaluated whether the costs
were reasonable through an
independent audit.

mented the new presumption against
the utility, has been considerable.
Independent construction cost audits
have since been conducted for
Edison's Byron 2, Braidwood 1, and
Braidwood 2 plants. On the basis of
those audits, the Commission disallowed $297 million, $334 million, and
$103 million, respectively, as unreasonable construction costs at those
plants.34 Taking the four Byron and
Braidwood plants as a whole, $1.06
billion in unreasonable Edison construction costs have now been placed
on Edison's shoulders rather than
ratepayers'. Edison's rates are well
over $100 million lower per year than
they would have been absent the disallowances.
Disallowances of such magnitude
would have been impossible without
shifting the burden of proving the reasonableness of construction costs to
utility companies as required by Section 30.1. Without the presumption
shift, consumer and government intervenors would have been less able
to oppose Edison's attempts to pass
on its unreasonable costs to consumers. Significantly, the switch in presumption and enhancement of the
Commission's oversight role brought
about by the litigation helped make
the 1993 settlement possible.
40

III. LA SALLE 1: FORCING
EDISON TO BEAR THE COST
CONSEQUENCES OF POOR
NUCLEAR PLANT
PERFORMANCE
Edison also has been forced to pay
refunds to consumers because of the
poor performance of one of its nuclear
power plants. Before 1978, the rate
formula for Illinois electric utilities
required Edison to charge ratepayers
a fixed amount for power plant operating, maintenance, and fuel costs.
This formula gave utilities an incentive to operate their plants efficiently.
If poor operation led to higher maintenance and fuel costs than the utility
was able to recover through its rates,
the utility would bear the extra costs.
Conversely, if the utility operated its
plants more efficiently than anticipated in the rate formula, it retained
the savings.
A few months after the Illinois
Supreme Court issued its first decision in the Byron 1 construction cost
litigation, the Commission entered an
order requiring Edison to pay a $70
million refund to consumers on account of the poor operation of the
LaSalle 1 nuclear plant during 1983,
its first year of operation." The
LaSalle decision marked the first time
that the Commission directly penalized a utility for unsatisfactory plant
performance.
In 1982, when Edison obtained a
$660 million rate hike from the Commission to place the LaSalle 1 nuclear
plant in the rate base, Edison told the
Commission that it expected LaSalle
1 to operate at approximately 60 percent of its rated power-generating capacity during 1983.36 However,
LaSalle 1 was shut down for most of
1983 because it had numerous problems,37 and it operated at only 17.7%
of its projected capacity that year.38
The LaSalle shutdowns required
Edison to purchase replacement power.
These costs were then passed on to its
ratepayers. As a result, Edison customers paid approximately $70 million more
than they would have if LaSalle 1 had
operated at the projected levels.39

During the Commission's reconciliation proceeding, a divided Commission ruled that Edison's operating
forecast for LaSalle I had been imprudent. The Commission therefore ordered Edison to refund $70 million that
its customers had paid for replacement
power, noting that Edison should have
known that pre-operation testing requirements would lead to a 1983 capacity
factor well under 60 percent.4n The
appellate court affirmed the refund order,41 forcing Edison to pay the refund.
IV. BYRON 2 AND BRAIDWOOD:
PROHIBITING RATE DEALS
BETWEEN EDISON AND THE
COMMISSION
In 1986, Edison began its efforts to
place its last three nuclear power
plants, Byron 2 and Braidwood 1 and
2, into the "rate base." This action
would allow the utility to begin earning a return on its investment in the
plants. Following the circuit court's
reversal of the Commission's rate hike
for Byron 1, which raised the prospect
The "used and useful" issue
was important in the BPI I
remand because even though
all of the Byron and
Braidwood plants were
completed and fully
operational, they were not all
needed to meet Edison
customers' electricity
demands.

of substantial construction cost disallowances for Edison's later plants,
Edison twice attempted to enter into a
rate "deal" with the Commission and
certain governmental parties.
In December 1986, the Illinois
Governor, Attorney General, and Cook
County State's Attorney supported an
Edison proposal that the Commission
forego traditional ratemaking hearings for the last three nuclear plants
and approve a deal to which Edison
and the governmental actors had all
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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agreed. Under this agreement, Edison
would be allowed to raise its rates by
$660 million per year to pay for the
three plants. 42 In return, Edison would
not seek a further rate increase for
another five years. 4 3 The City of Chicago and the non-governmental consumer intervenors in the Edison rate
proceedings opposed the agreement.
Just before the Commission was
scheduled to vote on the proposed
agreement, the Illinois Supreme Court
issued its HartiganI decision affirming Judge Curry's reversal of the Byron
1 rate order and emphasizing the paramount importance of conducting the
Section 30.1 construction cost audits
before placing new generating facilities in the rate base. As a result, the
Commission voted to reject the proposed deal in July 1987."
Edison subsequently filed a new,
traditional rate hike request. It sought
a $1.4 billion per year rate increase to
pay for the new plants. 45 In early
1988, however, experts from the Commission staff and consumer intervenors testified that Edison's rates
should be decreased by several hundred million dollars because of a reduction in the federal corporate tax
rate, lower interest rates, and other
cost reductions that Edison had received but not passed on to consumers.

46

Edison responded by striking another rate deal, this time with the Commission staff and its largest industrial
customers, who customarily intervene
in rate proceedings. In June 1988, the
Commission staff filed a motion for
an "alternative resolution. '47 The alternative proposed by the Commission staff was a two-stage, $480 million rate increase with a five-year rate
freeze. With the exception of the
industrial customers, consumer intervenors opposed the proposed settlement, this time joined by all participating governmental entities, including the Illinois Governor, the Mayor
of Chicago, and the Cook County
48
State's Attorney.
Despite the opposition, the Commission approved the "settlement
Volume 6 Number 2/Winter 1994

agreement" in a December 1988 order. The rate increase took effect on
January 1, 1989. Consumer and govWithout the presumption
shift, consumer and
government intervenors
would have been less able to
oppose Edison's attempts to
pass on its unreasonable
costs to consumers.
Significantly, the switch in
presumption and
enhancement of the
Commission's oversight role
brought about by the
litigation helped make the
1993 settlement possible.
ernmental parties then took a direct
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
which unanimously reversed the rate
order in December 1989, in Business
and ProfessionalPeoplefor the Public Interestv. Illinois Commerce Commission (BPI I).49
The Illinois Supreme Court's BPII
decision was a strong affirmation of
the standing of consumer intervenors
in rate proceedings, as well as a strong
admonition to the Commission to decide its cases by rational, consistent,
and lawful means in conformity with
the Public Utilities Act. The court
held that the Commission had no authority to enter a "settlement" to which
all intervenors, including consumer
organizations, had not agreed. Given
the objections of numerous real parties in interest, the Commission was
obliged to decide the rate case on the
merits, with substantial evidence to
support each of the factors in the
ratemaking formula set forth in the
Illinois Public Utilities Act. Thus,
consumer intervenors are full parties
in contested rate cases.5 0
The Illinois Supreme Court also
held that the Commission's settlement
was "void" because the Commission
did not have legal authority to enter
into such an agreement. The Court

ordered Edison to refund all of the
revenues it had collected under the
overturned rate order since the beginning of 1989, and to roll back its rates
to previous levels." Edison subsequently refunded approximately $420
million to its customers and reduced
its rates by $235 million per year.
V. BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD:
BARRING RATE RECOVERY
FOR EXCESS GENERATING
CAPACITY
On remand from the BPI I decision
ruling the Commission's "settlement
agreement" void, the Commission held
new evidentiary hearings to decide
the Byron/Braidwood rate case on the
merits. One of the key issues in the
litigation became the extent to which
Byron 2 and Braidwood 1 and 2 could
be considered "used and useful" in
light of Edison's considerable excess
generating capacity.
The Public
Utilities Act prohibits a utility from
placing new power plants into the rate
base unless they are "used and useful.'53

Prior to 1986, the Commission had
considerable discretion in choosing
standards to judge whether a plant
was "used and useful."54 However,
the Public Utilities Act, rewritten in
1986, expressly gave the Commission
the power to deny utilities cost recovery on unneeded plants. The revised
Act established a specific "need and
economic benefits" test, under which
a plant is considered "used and useful" only to the extent that it is necessary to meet customer demand or economically beneficial in meeting such
demand. The Act expressly empowers the Commission to take a utility's
excess capacity into account in making "used and useful" determinations
and setting rates.55
The new "used and useful" provision specifically states, however, that
generating plants under construction
before 1986 - such as the Byron and
Braidwood plants - should be evaluated under prior law rather than the
new statute. 6 In 1991, in Illinois
PowerCo. v. IllinoisCommerce Corn41

I
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mission (Illinois Power), the Illinois
Appellate Court construed that "grandfather" provision to bar the Commission from applying a "need and economic benefits" test to pre-1986
plants, even though those factors had
frequently been considered by the
Commission in making rate determi57
nations throughout the century.
The IllinoisPowerdecision caused
the Commission to use the less stringent "economic dispatch" test instead
of the "need and economic benefits"
test to evaluate whether the Byron 2
and Braidwood plants were "used and
useful."58 The two tests differ substantially. Under the "need and economic benefits" test, the Commission
first determines whether, in light of
the utility's total generating capacity
(including any excess capacity), a
plant is needed to meet customers'
electricity needs or whether the utility
already has sufficient capacity to meet
demand.59 By contrast, under the "economic dispatch" approach, the Commission merely determines whether,
in comparison to Edison's other plants,
the operating costs of the new plant
are sufficiently low to make running
the new plant economical compared to
existing plants. 6° This calculus ignores
construction costs and the possibility
that existing plants might go idle.
The "used and useful" issue was
important in the BPI Iremand because
even though all of the Byron and
Braidwood plants were completed and
fully operational, they were not all
needed to meet Edison customers'
electricity demands. Because Edison
has chosen to generate electricity from

The denial of a return on
Edison's excess capacity
required the Commission to
scale back the rate hike
dramatically. The final order
allowed Edison a rate hike of
$144 million per year, far
lower than the original $750
million increase the
Commission approved.
42

the Byron and Braidwood plants, it
has been forced to idle existing and
functional fossil fuel plants.

In three consecutive cases,
the court has allowed Edison
to collect higher rates
pending appeal only on the
condition that it refund
excess revenues in the event
of a reversal. This precedent
empowers future courts to
insist on setting equitable
refund terms in exchange for
allowing higher rates to be
collected pending appeal.
The Commission found that as of
1988, the generating capacity of all
the Byron and Braidwood plants, combined with Edison's existing capacity, exceeded its maximum demand
on the hottest summer day (its "peak
demand") by approximately 37 percent.61 In spite of a growing demand
for electricity, Edison's reserve capacity margin in 1992 was still at 30
percent.612 The industry standard for a
reserve capacity margin is only 15
percent above peak demand.6 3 When
judged by that 15 percent standard,
both Braidwood plants are entirely
unnecessary to meet current customer
demand. 6 However, in its rate order
on remand issued on March 8, 1991,
the Commission granted Edison a $750
million rate increase, based in significant part on a determination under
"economic dispatch" principles that
all three plants were 100 percent "used
65
and useful.
The Commission's order was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court,
which reversed and remanded several
issues, including the "used and useful" issue, in Business and Professional People for the Public Interest
v. Illinois Commerce Commission
(BPIII.) The court found that while
no particular "used and useful" test
was mandated prior to 1986, the Commission always had the discretion to

apply a "need and economic benefits"
test. This decision overruled Illinois
Power,and gave the Commission the
discretion to apply a "need and economic benefits" test to pre-1986
plants, including Byron 2 and the
Braidwood plants.67 On remand following the BPI H decision, the Commission did apply a "need and economic benefits" test to the Byron 2,
and Braidwood 1 and 2 plants. In its
final rate order, it found that Edison
had considerable excess capacity and
radically revised its "used and useful"
findings for the three plants. Even
allowing Edison a reserve margin of
20 percent, the Commission still found
that 7 percent of Byron 2, 79 percent
of Braidwood 1, and 100 percent of
Braidwood 2's capacity was unnecessary.68 The Commission, however,
allowed Edison to recover its reasonable construction costs for the three
plants, including the unneeded portions,
but denied Edison the right to earn the
customary return on its investment in
the unneeded portions of the plants. 69
The denial of a return on Edison's
excess capacity required the Commission to scale back the rate hike dramatically. The final order allowed
Edison a rate hike of $144 million per
year, 70 far lower than the original $750
million increase the Commission approved. The mandatory use of a "need
and economic benefits" test will result in fundamental changes for future
plants subject to the Act.
VI. BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD:
ENSURING FULL REFUNDS OF
OVERCHARGES AND
ESTABLISHING THE
EQUITABLE POWER OF
REVIEWING COURTS TO SET
FAIR REFUND TERMS
The courts overseeing the Byron
and Braidwood refunds used their equitable powers in a manner that has
effectively created new ground rules
for Public Utilities Act refunds. Most
importantly, the courts have all but
nullified a rule that for decades had
prevented customers, after the reversal of a Commission-approved rate
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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Those records revealed that
Barnich had made over 375
telephone calls from his
Commission telephone during
1990 and 1991 to
Commonwealth Edison
executives, including
Edison's chairman of the
board, as well as consultants
and lobbyists. A significant
number of those calls
occurred at particularly
important junctures in the
Edison rate case before the
Commission. Chairman
Barnich defended himself
against accusations of
impropriety by explaining that
those Edison officials and
lobbyists were his "best
friends."
increase, from obtaining a refund of
the increased rates charged pending
appeal. The courts also have showed
a willingness to set an equitable interest rate on certain refunds, rather than
being bound by the 5 percent interest
rate set forth in the Public Utilities
Act.
The prior refund rule was set in
1954, when the Illinois Supreme Court
held in Mandel Brothers, Inc. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co. that a Commission-approved rate increase
charged to consumers pending appeal
cannot be refunded even if an appellate court rules that it is illegal and
excessive. The court reasoned that
the Public Utilities Act specifically
requires utilities to charge newly set
rates pending the appeal of those rates,
and that it would contradict the terms
of the Act later to deem such charges
excessive." The Illinois Supreme
Court reaffirmed Mandel Brothers in
1987.72 The Illinois General Assembly has rejected at least two legislative proposals to repeal the rule.73
Nothing in Mandel Brothers preVolume 6 Number 2 / Winter 1994
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vents a court from staying a rate increase pending appeal. However, because the Act required the posting of
an appeal bond, consumer and governmental intervenors historically
have not been able to obtain such
stays or to avoid the effect of the
Mandel Brothers rule. Such bonds
would have been prohibitively expensive given the tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars involved in most
utility rate hikes.
The Mandel Brothers rule has repeatedly worked to the detriment of
consumers. For example, in Independent Voters, Illinois Bell was allowed
to keep 14 months worth of profits
from a rate increase that the court
found unlawful. Similarly, in the
Byron 1 litigation, the court allowed
Edison to keep approximately $200
million in higher rates that it collected
from the date of the Commission's
October 1985 rate-increase order until Judge Curry reversed that order in
April 1986.11
Although Mandel Brothers has not
been overruled, two concurrent events
over the course of the Byron and
Braidwood litigation have limited its
effect. First, in 1986, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Public
Utilities Act to allow the state attorney general, the Office of Public Counsel,75 or any city or other governmental body, to petition for a stay or suspension of a rate order without posting a bond.7 6 Second, the courts have
shown a willingness to exercise their
powers under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 305 to fashion equitable arrangements pending appeal, including imposing refund terms.
The Byron 1 litigation, discussed
in Part I of this article, paved the way
for this change. When Judge Curry
issued his opinion reversing the
Commission's rate-hike order in April
1986, he ordered Edison to immediately roll back its rates to their previous level. Edison then filed an emergency motion requesting that the rates
be allowed to remain in effect pending further appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Judge Curry issued an

equitable order allowing the higher
rates to remain in effect, subject to a
full refund if his order was ultimately
upheld. The order specifically retained jurisdiction in the circuit court
to determine the refund terms, including an appropriate interest rate, and to
administer the refund.77 This order
became the model for avoiding the
harsh Mandel Brothers rule.
After the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed Judge Curry's reversal of the
Byron 1 rate order, and the Commission determined on remand to disallow more Byron 1 construction costs
as unreasonable, Judge Curry asserted
his retained jurisdiction and issued a
series of refund orders, including an
order directing Edison to pay interest
at 9 percent rather than the 5 percent
rate set forth in the Public Utilities
Act.78 Both the Commission and
Edison appealed Judge Curry's refund orders to the Illinois Supreme
Court, arguing that any refund must
be administered by the Commission
under the terms of the Public Utilities
Act.
In its HartiganII decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Judge
Curry's jurisdiction over the refund
and his equitable power to set its terms.
The court reasoned that once Edison
requested a stay of the rate appeal
from Judge Curry, it invoked his equitable powers under supreme court rule
305 to condition the stay on such terms
as he deemed just and reasonable.
The refund terms were thus derived
not from the Public Utilities Act, but
rather from Judge Curry's inherent
equitable powers.79 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed certain refund
terms Judge Curry had established,
including the 9 percent interest rate.
The Byron 1 approach of allowing
a rate hike to take effect pending appeal, but only subject to a refund
pledge, was adopted after each of
Edison's subsequent rate hikes in 1988
and 1991.1 0 These pledges were, in
part, the basis for Edison's agreement
to provide refunds in the 1993 settlement of the rate cases.
Enforcement of Edison's pledge
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agreements, in conjunction with the
HartiganH decision affirming Judge
Curry's equitable power to administer refunds, has created a new refund
procedure that effectively supplants
the Mandel Brothers rule. In three
consecutive cases, the court has allowed Edison to collect higher rates
pending appeal only on the condition
that it refund excess revenues in the
event of a reversal. This precedent
empowers future courts to insist on
setting equitable refund terms in exchange for allowing higher rates to be
collected pending appeal.
VII. ENSURING IMPARTIALITY BY
COMMERCE COMMISSIONERS
The Edison rate litigation also included an important decision concerning the responsibility of Commerce
Commissioners to maintain their impartiality. During the Commission's
deliberations on remand from the BPI
Idecision, which rejected the rate deal
between Edison and the Commission
discussed in Part III of this article, the
telephone records of then Commission Chairman Terry Barnich were
made public through a Freedom of
Information Act request. Those
records revealed that Barnich had
made over 375 telephone calls from
his Commission telephone during
1990 and 1991 to Commonwealth
Edison executives, including Edison's
chairman of the board, as well as consultants and lobbyists.8 A significant
number of those calls occurred at particularly important junctures in the
Edison rate case before the Commission. Chairman Barnich defended
himself against accusations of impropriety by explaining that those Edison
officials and lobbyists were his "best
friends." He also maintained that the
calls may have been required by statute. Barnich ignored motions to recuse
himself from participating in the
Edison rate case deliberations, and
the other commissioners ruled that
they were powerless to remove a peer
commissioner from the case. 2
Consumer intervenors filed a mandamus action in the Circuit Court of

Cook County to have Barnich removed
from the case on the grounds of an
appearance of impropriety. The circuit court refused, but the Illinois
Appellate Court quickly issued an order to bar Barnich from deliberating
or ruling on Edison's rate increase
request. In its opinion Business and
Professional People for the Public
Interestv. Barnich, the appellate court
explained that Commerce Commissioners, who serve in a quasi-judicial
capacity, are subject to the same standards of conduct as judges, and must
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The appellate court held that
on their face the telephone records
created an appearance of impropriety,
even without delving into the substance of the conversations. The appellate court required Barnich's
recusal to protect public confidence
in the Commission and the ratemaking
process.83

In the short term, rates will be
lowered substantially by the
refund and rate reduction
Edison agreed to in
September 1993. The refund
alone will lower residential
customers' bills by 25 percent
and other customers' bills by
approximately 19 percent
during the one-year refund
period.
VIII. THE 1993 SETTLEMENT
In spite of the plethora of court and
Commission decisions concerning the
Byron and Braidwood plants, several
issues remained unresolved in 1993.
In the first half of 1993, the Commission issued lengthy decisions on remand from the supreme court's decisions in Hartigan II, which required
the Commission to review its findings
on the reasonableness of the Byron 1
plant costs, and BPI II, which permitted the Commission to adopt the "need
and economic benefits" standard in
evaluating the need for new power

[T]he Commission and the
courts are likely to take the
arguments of consumer
intervenors more seriously.
The Illinois Supreme Court
clearly indicated that
consumer intervenors must
be treated as full parties, and
must not be subjected to
burdens of proof that should
properly be borne by utilities.
plants. Both of those decisions by the
Commission were appealed by Edison
and consumer and governmental intervenors to the appellate court. Other
Edison matters were pending in the
appellate court, including an appeal
over the interest rate applicable to the
BPI I refund required after invalidation of the rate "deal" between Edison
and the Commission discussed in Part
III of this article, and appeals of a
Commission order involving the differential between the rates Edison
charges to residential customers during the summer and winter.
On September 26, 1993, after
lengthy negotiations, Edison and all
other parties to those appeals agreed
to a comprehensive settlement requiring Edison to pay a total refund of
approximately $1.3 billion to
ratepayers over a 12-month period.
Edison also had to abide by the
Commission's January 1993 rate order granting it a $144 million rate
increase rather than the higher increases previously approved by the
Commission, in exchange for all parties withdrawing all pending appeals
relating to the Byron and Braidwood
plants. The agreement also gave
Edison permission to file a rate increase petition to recover more of the
costs of Byron 2 and Braidwood 1 and
2 after December 21, 1993.4 Consumer and governmental parties are
free to oppose any such petition. Refund payments began with bills mailed
in November 1993, and Edison simultaneously implemented a $339 milLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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lion rate reduction to bring its rates in
line with the January 1993 rate order.85
IX. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NEW LEGAL AND
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
After almost a decade of litigation,
the Edison cases have brought many
benefits to its utility customers. However, whether ratepayers keep these
benefits may depend in part on whether
they can find the resources necessary
to protect their gains.
A. Future Rates
In the short term, rates will be lowered substantially by the refund and
rate reduction Edison agreed to in
September 1993. The refund alone
will lower residential customers' bills
by 25 percent and other customers'
bills by approximately 19 percent during the one-year refund period. In
addition, consumers have already received substantial economic benefits
through large refunds and foregone
rate increases over the past five years.
However, when the refund period
ends, Edison customers will again pay
rates substantially higher than the national average.
In the medium term, there is a danger of a future rate hike if Edison
attempts again to have the Commission declare the Braidwood plants and
the remainder of the Byron 2 plant
"used and useful," so that Edison can
begin to earn a return on the plants.
However, such a rate increase is by no
means certain, because other factors
in the rate formula, such as currently
low interest rates, would offset
Edison's showing that more of the
plants are "used and useful."
B. A New Climate in Rate Cases
The Edison litigation should also
change the climate of future Illinois
rate litigation in at least four ways.
First, the courts appear to have reconsidered their traditional deference to
the Commission. Because the Illinois
Supreme Court extensively reviewed
the ratemaking process and reversed
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portions of four Commission rate orders, future courts may scrutinize
Commission decisions more carefully.
Such a development should benefit
ratepayers, who historically have fared
less well before the Commission than
powerful utility companies.
Second, the Commission and the
courts are likely to take the arguments of
consumer intervenors more seriously.
The Illinois Supreme Court clearly indicated that consumer intervenors must be
treated as full parties, and must not be
subjected to burdens of proof that should
properly be borne by utilities.
Third, the Commission should play
a more aggressive and impartial oversight role. This derives from the supreme court's admonitions in the
Hartigan I decision, the appellate
court's admonitions in the Barnich
decision, and the unspoken but powerful message sent by the supreme
court's reversal of four consecutive
Commission orders as overly favorable to a utility.
Finally, ratepayers should be
treated more equitably in future refund situations. Before the recent
litigation, consumers could be certain
that even if they successfully appealed
adverse Commission rate orders, the
Mandel Brothers rule and the low 5
percent interest rate specified in the
Public Utilities Act would prevent
them from getting back all their
money. The utility company stood to
gain financially even if it lost in court
because it was allowed to retain rate
hikes collected pending lengthy appeals and by earning substantial interest on money held subject to refund.
That situation has now changed.
The long-term impact of
consumers' gains in the
recent cases may well be
determined by the extent to
which a reliable funding
mechanism is developed for
consumer participation in
Commission proceedings and
related court cases.

C. Shift Away from Exclusive
Reliance on Large Power Plants
In the long term, utility customers should benefit considerably from
the nuclear plant litigation and reforms to the Public Utility Act because they should help to drive
Edison and other electric utilities
away from their traditional reliance
on large power plants. Discouraging reliance upon both nuclear and
fossil fuel power plants will force
utilities to pursue energy efficiency
strategies, which are more economical and better for the environment.
Edison and other utilities will have
to pursue these alternatives because
their financial incentive to build
large power plants has been dramatically reduced. Because of the
construction cost and "used and useful" disallowances in the recent litigation, the substantial return on utility investments in large generating
plants,8 6 which seemed so certain in
the past, is no longer a sure thing.
In addition, the Illinois Public
Utilities Act has been revised to
prohibit utilities from considering
construction of large power plants
as their first option when power
demand increases in the future. The
so-called "least cost planning" provisions of the Act now require electric utilities to prepare 20-year plans
detailing how they will meet customers' needs by utilizing "all available, practical and economical conservation, renewable resources, cogeneration and improvements in
energy efficiency" before consider87
ing building a large power plant.
For example, if a utility can avoid
building a power plant by inducing
customers to reduce their electricity
demand by means of more efficient
air conditioners, lights, and motors,
then the utility must choose the latter
course unless it is more expensive
than building the plant. The adoption
of the "least cost" planning process
marked a fundamental policy shift in
utility law in Illinois and should be
relied upon more extensively as a result of the litigation against Edison.
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D. A Continuing Imbalance in
Resources
Although these gains are impressive, utility companies still enjoy one
powerful advantage over consumer
intervenors that was reinforced by this
litigation: they have superior resources to litigate. As a result, utilities are winning a war of attrition with
respect to traditional consumer-side
opponents. The long-term impact of
consumers' gains in the recent cases
may well be determined by the extent
to which a reliable funding mechanism is developed for consumer participation in Commission proceedings
and related court cases.
Commission rate cases and other
adjudications are structured as
adversarial proceedings. They are
often enormously complex, requiring
not only substantial attorney resources, but also extensive participation by expert consultants and witnesses. For example, from 1986 to
1988, Commonwealth Edison spent at
least $27 million on consultants to
assist in its litigation efforts concerning the Byron and Braidwood plants.88
However, an adversarial system cannot function properly unless consumer
intervenors have attorney and expert
resources that are generally commensurate with the utility's.
Utilities have deep pockets and their
attorneys fees and expert expenses are
generally paid by ratepayers, while
consumer and governmental parties
must continue to rely on charitable
donations and scarce tax dollars to
mount their cases. In spite of consumer intervenors' considerable success in the past decade of litigation,
they received no attorneys' fees. The
Public Utilities Act has no provision
allowing successful intervenors to recoup fees, and intervenors' sole attempt to recover fees (following the
$250 million Byron I refund) was
rejected by the circuit court.89 By
contrast, the Commission routinely
allows Edison to recover its legal expenses, including rate case expenses,
through rates, even if Edison is not the
prevailing party. For example, the
46

Commission allowed Edison to recover $2.5 million in rate case expenses, including legal fees, incurred
in 1991 alone. 90
Moreover, in all but a few states,
the principal consumer-side utility
advocate is state-funded. In Illinois,
however, the three state-funded organizations created by the Public Utilities Act for the express purpose of
representing consumers in utility cases
the Office of Public Counsel, the
Utilities have deep pockets
and their attorneys fees and
expert expenses are generally
paid by ratepayers, while
consumer and governmental
parties must continue to rely
on charitable donations and
scarce tax dollars to mount
their cases. In spite of
consumer intervenors'
considerable success in the
past decade of litigation, they
received no attorneys' fees.
Governor's Office of Consumer Services, and the Small Business Utility
Advocate - have been stripped of all
funding in recent years and effectively
abolished. Other governmental organizations, such as the Illinois Attorney General, the City of Chicago, and
the State's Attorney of Cook County,
have only limited budgets for public
utilities interventions, and are subject
to ever-changing political forces.
The not-for-profit Citizens Utility
Board (CUB), a statewide watchdog
group, must rely entirely on charitable contributions from consumers,
and it must cover proceedings involving dozens of gas, electric, and telephone utilities throughout the state
with an annual budget of under $2
million. Even CUB's fundraising ability is tenuous. In 1986, a federal court
terminated CUB's right to insert
fundraising materials in utility bill
mailings. In the 1992 session, the Illinois Senate passed a bill, which later

failed in the Illinois House, that would
have eliminated CUB's primary remaining fundraising mechanism its ability to insert promotional materials in state-government mailings. A
few other not-for-profit entities, such
as Business and Professional People
for the Public Interest, participated
extensively in the Edison cases. But
such activity is not a primary mission
of those organizations, and there is no
assurance that it will continue.
Thus, Illinois utilities have greater,
and more reliable, litigation resources
than consumer intervenors. Numerous
mechanisms could be developed to fund
substantial and consistent consumer intervenor participation in Commission
and court rate proceedings, thereby lessening that imbalance. They include:
recovery through rates of consumer intervenors' rate case expenses; awarding
fees on a common fund theory from
refunds; providing statutory fees for litigants who obtain reversals of rate orders; and devoting portions of utility
refund pools to consumer intervention
funds. Such mechanisms should be explored to ensure fairness in future rate
determination proceedings o:.
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Bad Traffic Interferes
with Cardiac Care
A new study published in the
Journal of the American Medical
Association shows that bad traffic
is to blame for the dismal survival
rate of anyone whose heart stops in
a major U.S. city. The study found
that between October 1990 and April
1991, only 1.4 of 100 people in New
York City survived after all types of
cardic arrest occurred outside a hospital. Mid-size suburban and urban
areas had the highest rates of survival, the study showed.
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